Warlordism persisted, though appearing in a new form, after Jiang Jieshi completed the Northern Expedition. A contemporary political commentator ascribed this phenomenon to Jiang's eagerness for military victory and his policy of appointing rival military leaders as commanders of the National Revolutionary Army. Warlords thus survived and continued to challenge the Nanjing government under the guise of armed comrades of the Guomindang (GMD), rendering "national reunification" nominal rather than real. The same commentator succinctly pinpointed three features of "separatist military rule" (junren geju): first, the elimination of all non-affiliated military units within the warlord's sphere of influence; second, the appropriation of both national and local revenues by the warlord, as well as the expending of such revenues largely for military purposes; and third, the filling up of all government posts, at the provincial and sub-provincial levels, by the warlord's henchmen (Hua Yan, 1932: 10).
Chen Jitang's regime in Guangdong in the 1930s displayed all the above characteristics. Although a recent biography of Chen asserts that he "did not have control of territories in mind" (meiyou dipan sixiang) (Lin Huaping, 1996: 10) , it fails to convince. Chen, whom contemporaries referred to as "King of the Southern Skies" (Nantianwang), belonged to a new genre of separatist military leaders labeled by historians as "residual," "reformist," "Guomindang" or "new" warlords (Sheridan, 1966: 14-16; Lary, 1974:130-31; Hsu, 1995: 540) . These warlords saw themselves as faithful disciples of Sun Yixian, and professed to carry out reforms based on Sun's teachings. They also pledged allegiance to Jiang Jieshi, but challenged him for violation of Sun's Three People's Principles whenever conflict of interests arose.
Differences existed among these warlords. Chen Jitang, for instance, was different from his Guangxi ally, Li Zongren, in the sense that he was parochial in outlook. His agenda aimed essentially at "safeguarding Guangdong and providing reassurance to the Guangdong people" (baojing anmin). Unsurprisingly, Chen's attitude towards Jiang vacillated, as it was contingent on the extent to which Jiang's policy threatened his domain. In this respect, Chen also differed from Li who was persistently anti-Jiang (Shi Jiashun, 1992: 133-34) . Notwithstanding differences among the warlords, no warlord could have failed to realize the fact that the very survival of his regime depended essentially on ready access to the sinews of war. Thus, a warlord's primary concern was to maximize revenue in order to finance his war machine. Such an overriding concern was detrimental to the task of realizing whatever ideals a warlord might have for the betterment of society.
Scholarly studies of the "residual" warlords reveal genuine efforts to achieve provincial regeneration. These works suggest that the warlord period was not necessarily an era of fruitless strife, but one that permitted and even encouraged (Guangdongsheng dang'anguan, 1995-96: 12/380-413, 13/1-32 Mingshu organized four "security corps" (baoantuan) which were assigned to pacify the localities. They were placed under the Guangdong Provincial Government, and this aroused the suspicions of Chen Jitang (Luo Yiqun, 1987: 83; Zhu Zongzhen, 1997: 65) .
A dramatic turn of event drew Chen Jitang into the vortex of GMD factional struggles, and paved the way for his eventual domination of Guangdong. In late Sad to say, the Guangzhou National Government comprised a medley of rival politicians and militarists who would have warred against one another had it not been for their ambitions to do away with Jiang Jieshi. The situation in Guangzhou in the second half of 1931 actually turned out to be a farce. Chen Jitang played a crucial role in this separatist movement by providing military support. He faced a delicate situation, and needed to calculate every move to make sure that his own power base would not fall prey to GMD factional politics. There is little doubt, however, that
Chen had benefited tremendously from getting involved. In the first place, he got rid commander-in-chief (Luo Yiqun, 1987: 87-88) . This greatly enhanced his position and power. And finally, since Li Zongren joined the separatist movement, hostilities with
Guangxi ceased and a long-term threat to Guangdong's security was removed.
Apparently, Chen Jitang had emerged as a victor in the separatist movement.
Tension between Guangzhou and Nanjing eased after the Mukden Incident (18 September) and the subsequent release of Hu Hanmin (13 October). Negotiations ensued, which fully exposed the conflicts among the separatists and made a mockery of unity against Jiang Jieshi. On 1 January 1932, Chen Jitang dissolved the Guangzhou National Government, which signified the termination of confrontation with Nanjing. However, two new organs with self-assigned authority over Guangdong and Guangxi were simultaneously inaugurated: the Southwest Executive Branch of the Central Executive Committee of the GMD and the Southwest Political Council of the National Government (Luo Yiqun, 1987: 88-90) . Though professing allegiance to Nanjing, Chen had actually brought about the semi-independence of the southwest.
By March 1932, Chen Jitang, with the help of his crony Lin Yizhong, had grasped control of all provincial, municipal and county party organs in Guangdong (Liu Tingsheng, 1987: 135-38) . As regards the provincial government, Chen's principal concern was to hold the purse strings. An opportunity arrived when Feng Zhuwan, who headed Guangdong's Department of Finance and was close to Jiang
Jieshi, resigned on 6 May. Chen immediately replaced Feng by his henchman, Qu Fangpu, to make sure that Guangdong's revenue would henceforth be at his disposal (Guangdongsheng dang'anguan, 1995-96: 13/151 Yiqun, 1987: 88, 92-94; Ding Jixu, 1987: 172-77; Li Jiezhi and Jiang Luo, 1987: 150-51 independent brigades and 8 new independent regiments (see Table 1 ). This tripled the size of the Guangdong army, which rose from 50,000 to 150,000 men. Apart from minor reorganization at the division and brigade levels after 1932, the military establishment of Guangdong remained more or less the same until the fall of Chen in July 1936 (Li Jiezhi and Jiang Luo, 1987: 145, 153-54) .
Efforts were also made to manufacture and purchase modern weaponry. The existing Shijing Arsenal, which produced cartridges, rifles, machine guns and smokeless powder, was expanded during 1933-35 to include a new grenade plant, a new mortar plant and a new power plant. It employed 2,000 workers and technicians, operated 12 hours a day, and had a capacity of producing 2,100,000 cartridges, 1,000 rifles, 6-18 German-style heavy machine guns, 6-18 mortars, 1,200 shells and 20,000 grenades a month. Its total monthly outlay was in the region of 200,000 yuan (Guangdong dollars) (Li Jiezhi and Jiang Luo, 1987: 147-48) . Chen Jitang Jiezhi and Jiang Luo, 1987: 145-6, 151. nevertheless found the Shijing Arsenal deficient in producing cannon. In July 1933, Chen and Li Zongren deputized their respective chiefs-of-staff, Mou Peinan and Zhang Renmin, to sign a contract with Hänschenklein Böcklin, a German arms dealer, to undertake the construction of a new arsenal at Pajiang for the sum of HK$5,490,800. In September, Chen again deputized Mou to sign another contract with Böcklin to undertake the building of a gas mask plant for the sum of HK$295,000. It was reckoned that Chen had spent a total of 11,000,000 dayuan (national dollars) on these two projects. That sum was practically wasted. Although the Pajiang Arsenal trial-produced a 10.5 cm. fieldpiece and two 7.5 cm. mortars in 1935, it did not go into operation, whereas the gas mask plant did not even start trial-producing when Chen fell from power (Li Jiezhi and Jiang Luo, 1987: 148-49; Deng Yancun, 1987: 161-67 (Li Jiezhi and Jiang Luo, 1987: 152-53; Ding Jixu, 1987: 177-81) .
As regards the navy, Chen Jitang's prime concern was to rid it of Chen Ce's 
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Control of the basic level was further facilitated by the launching of "local
self-government" (difang zizhi). In February 1932, the Department of Civil
Administration established an institute to train local self-government personnel, and a total of 3,419 persons had graduated from this institute by March 1936 (Guangdongsheng minzhengting, 1936 . 13 These people, together with graduates of the "advanced political study course," constituted the backbone of Chen Jitang's local government functionaries. Even the "cooperative movement" (hezuo yundong), as John Fitzgerald points out, "was only incidentally a movement for alleviating rural poverty in the province," for it was actually "a tactical arm of a grand bureaucratic strategy for pacifying the province, extending provincial government authority, and routinizing local administration" (Fitzgerald, 1997: 451) . Moreover, in order to eradicate the armed basis of gentry power in the localities, Chen wrested control of the "local security guard teams" (difang jingweidui) from the hands of the gentry. In 1934, he set up a special office within the General Headquarters of the First Group Army to take charge of the reorganization of all "local security guard teams."
He also started a training course in the Guangdong Military Political Academy with a view to nurturing loyal "security guards" (Guangdongsheng minzhengting, 1936: 37). 14 Clearly, Chen Jitang strove to achieve monopoly of power in all sectors of state and society, and at all levels; for this would eliminate threats to his rule and allow him to tap resources as he wished.
Admittedly, Chen recognized the importance of gaining mass support. He nevertheless feared letting the masses go their own way, as he once remarked: "The power of the masses is great. Yet, the masses are easily deceived, and they easily abuse power….Our party must therefore open-heartedly guide them and arouse them…to stand by and fight with us" (Chen Jitang, 1928: 19) . Chen was probably driven by a real concern for the well being of the toiling masses, and saw himself playing the role of a benevolent patriarch. When some reporters solicited his views on good governance, he promptly replied: "First, make sure that the folks have food to eat; second, make sure that they have enough to eat; and third, make sure that they eat well" (Chen Jitang xiansheng, 1974: 80) .
In launching the "Three-Year Administrative Plan," Chen obviously wanted to impress upon the people of Guangdong that his government had much to offer. He promised, among other things, to wipe out banditry, abolish exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous levies, reduce rent, provide relief to the poor, popularize education, promote agriculture and industry, and improve transport and communication. It is not the purpose of this article to assess the effectiveness of the "Three-Year
Administrative Plan." The following discussion will nevertheless show that Chen had difficulties fulfilling his promises because he was primarily concerned with tapping resources to finance his war machine.
FUNDING A WARLORD REGIME: METHODS AND REPURCUSSIONS

MILITARY EXPENSES IN GUANGDONG'S BUDGET
Finances constitute the mainstay of any government. Tables 2 and 3 present a profile of the fiscal situation in Guangdong from the beginning of the Republic to the mid-1930s. The data reveal an excess of expenditure over income for all fiscal years (except 1912-13) , and this was due to the fact that Guangdong incurred huge military expenses in this period.
With reference to the period 1912-29, Table 2 shows that of the 18 fiscal years recorded, there were 13 in which tax receipts were insufficient to cover military expenses. On the average, military expenses accounted for 93% of all taxes received by the provincial government during those years. Taking both tax and non-tax receipts into calculation, the proportion of military expenses to total revenue ranged from 50%
in some years to 100% in some other years, averaging 68% for the period. In absolute terms, military expenses soared to an all-time high of 83,266,000 yuan in 1926-27.
The reason is that Guangdong bore the costs of the Northern Expedition that started out from this province. As observed by the American journalist Hallett Abend, "Canton, by the end of June [1926] , was like a squeezed lemon. All the juice and flavor was gone. It was a city of apathy" (Abend, 1943: 33 1930-31 5,994,699 23,940,660 29,935,359 1,672,362 31,607,721 14,528,603 4,150,277 10,179,937 28,858,817 20,537,010 49,395,827 81,003,548 1931-32 8,361,699 24,099,463 32,461,162 3,855,605 36,316,767 13,583,506 4,483,270 9,864,077 27,930,853 15,350,434 43,281,287 79,598,054 1932-33 8,699,971 23,824,449 32,524,420 3,959,155 36,483,575 17,370,969 4,304,725 10,055,499 31,731,193 17,226,681 48,957,874 85,441,449 1933-34 12,165,181 27,245,311 39,410,491 4,175,441 43,585,933 15,186,696 28,487,312 43,674,008 12,988,911 56,662,919 100,248,852 1934-35 11,271,292 27,636,778 38,908,070 5,004,956 43,913,026 13,282,991 38,898,720 52,181,711 22,045,527 74,227,238 118,140,264 Expenditure ( National & Provincial Treasury 1930 -31 40,256,960 56,648,422 16,988,095 65,666,101 122,314,534 − 25,040,701 − 16,270,274 − 41,310,986 1931 -32 50,263,877 65,470,983 13,358,145 57,260,340 122,731,323 − 29,154,216 − 13,979,053 − 43,133,269 1932 -33 45,412,780 55,947,639 15,401,788 63,969,102 119,916,741 − 19,464,064 − 14,993,228 − 34,475,292 1933 -34 55,288,486 62,660,756 26,269,370 52,918,078 115,578,834 − 19,074,823 + 3,744,841 − 15,329,982 1934 Source: Guangdongsheng caizhengting, 1934 : 1/112-15, 3/466-528 (For the fiscal years 1930 -31, 1931 -32 and 1932 Xiong Li, 1935: 7-17; Xiong Li, 1936 : 2/533-35 (For the fiscal years 1933 -34 and 1934 .
was due to the proliferation of a large number of "miscellaneous taxes and levies" (shuijuan) which the provincial government found attractive, as they were easier to collect and yielded quicker returns than the land tax. Of particular importance was the gambling tax, euphemistically called the "defense fund" (chouxiang). Except for two brief periods when Chen Jiongming ruled Guangdong and decided to wipe out gambling (Huang Linsheng, 1936: 31-33; Wei Gong, 1964: 106, 109-10) , the gambling tax provided a lucrative source of income for financing military campaigns across the province. Indeed, the gambling tax had become the most important source of tax income in Guangdong ever since the GMD prepared for the Northern Expedition, amounting to 3-5 times the land tax collected and accounting for 14-20% of the total provincial revenue during 1925-29.
The Guangdong government had also accumulated huge debts over the years in order to make up deficits. They included mainly government debts to the central bank, public bonds and treasury notes. By early 1928, the provincial treasury had inherited debts amounting to 200,000,000 yuan, half of which were contracted during 1924-27 (Guangdongsheng caizhengting, 1934: 1/57-58) .
What was the fiscal situation like after the ascendancy of Chen Jitang? Table 3 shows that the general state of finance in Guangdong during 1930-35 was more or less the same as in the preceding period. The provincial government continued to register budget deficits. The land tax still constituted 5% of the total revenue, whereas the gambling tax amounted to three times the land tax collected. Military expenses, ranging from 40-60 million yuan per annum, remained the most important item of expenditure. On the average, they accounted for 71% of all tax receipts and 54% of the total revenue. Although Guangdong was free from war in this period, Chen
Jitang's mammoth military program, as well as his campaigns against bandits and Communists, had kept military spending at a high level throughout his rule.
The inauguration of tax sharing between the central and provincial governments in the Nanjing era complicated fiscal administration and constituted a major source of disputes between Guangdong and Nanjing. Although tax-sharing arrangements were finalized by Song Ziwen in July 1928, it was not until the fiscal year 1930-31 that Guangdong's budget drew a distinction between national revenue and expenditure on the one hand, and provincial revenue and expenditure on the other (Guangdongsheng caizhengting, 1934: 1/66-67, 3/466-87) .
16 Table 4 In order to defray military expenses, an arrangement was made to the effect that the provincial treasury would make up the deficits of the national treasury (Guangdongsheng caizhengting, 1934: 1/66 ). This modus operandi generated conflicts between Chen Jitang and Chen Mingshu when the latter was Chairman of the Guangdong Provincial Government.
In his memoirs, Chen Mingshu recalls that Chen Jitang "had never interfered with government affairs under my jurisdiction;" yet, he ridicules Chen Jitang as one who "pretends to be a pig and swallows up a tiger" (banzhu chi laohu) (Zhu Zongzhen, 1997: 67, 121 The revenues that Guangdong ought to remit to the central government have all been turned over to Chen Jitang to defray his military spending. Still not satisfied, he draws money from the provincial treasury. His army comprises only five divisions and, according to central regulations governing military expenditure, he requires less than 1,500,000 yuan a month to pay his troops. However, Chen Jitang demands 4,300,000 yuan a month, which is three times more than what is needed to maintain a central army of the same size. He also gets 800,000 yuan a month from those areas in Guangxi that he occupies, without reporting this to the central authorities and waiting for central allocation. It all adds up to over 5,000,000 yuan a month…. Consequently, Chen Mingshu, Chairman of the Guangdong Provincial Government, finds it impossible to get anything done. Gambling cannot be banned and bandits cannot be wiped out because Chen Jitang's army has seized all incomes. Nothing can get moving. Chairman Chen has long wished to resign…[for] such a state of affairs has been going on for a long time…. Chen Jitang, on the other hand, has also been long dissatisfied with Chairman Chen Mingshu, as he cannot levy taxes according to his own wish. In particular, after the central government abolishes the collection of likin, Chen Jitang's troops can no longer go around extorting likin as they had done before. This has aroused their dissatisfaction…. All these matters can be confirmed by official telegrams. They are based on evidence that can be verified. [Guangdongsheng dang'anguan, 1985: 95] With the departure of Chen Mingshu and especially after the appointment of Qu Until Chen's fall, Guangdong was beyond Nanjing's reach in matters of finance.
No revenue was ever submitted to Nanjing because military expenses, which came under the category of national expenditure, always exceeded the total annual revenue of the national treasury. This not only angered Jiang Jieshi, but also alienated those people who cherished de facto national reunification ("Jinhou zhi Yue ju," 1936:10).
Significantly, Chen Jitang's rule of Guangdong shows that fiscal autonomy, rather than men at arms, provided the very foundation of military separatism. Scholarly works on "residual warlordism" seldom explore the fiscal relationship between particular warlord regimes and the central government. We only know from Robert Kapp's study of Sichuan that, apart from a very small portion of the salt tax revenue, none of the other so-called "national taxes" were ever forwarded to Nanjing (Kapp, 1973: 71) . The extent to which this phenomenon prevailed in China during the Nanjing era will come to light when more case studies are conducted.
TAPPING THE SOURCE OF FINANCE (KAIYUAN)
To obtain the sinews of war and to keep his regime afloat, Chen Jitang racked his brain to find the quickest and most economical means of increasing incomes.
Although he promised to reduce tax burdens, he failed to live up to his promise because of the imperative and urgent need to tap every possible source of finance.
Following is a discussion of Chen's methods of increasing incomes and their repercussions. Table 3 shows that total tax revenue (that is, receipts from both national and provincial taxes) had increased from 58,794,176 yuan in 1930-31 to 91,089,781 yuan in 1934-35. As mentioned, the Guangdong government's tax revenue depended largely on "miscellaneous taxes and levies." They were usually collected by tax-farmers, and several layers of underwriting companies often existed.
I. Increasing Tax Revenue.
Though most of these taxes originated as ad hoc levies, they were as a rule regularized and so, they accumulated over the long run. In Zhongshan county, for instance, a total of 60 "miscellaneous taxes and levies" existed by the 1930s, including the obnoxious excrement tax. Angry taxpayers had reportedly composed a couplet, which they sent to one of the tax-farmers. It read: "A tax on excrement was never heard of in the past; these days, everything carries a levy except when we fart" (Xiao Baoyao, 1989: 26-27) . The numbers of "miscellaneous taxes and levies" actually varied from county to county and from place to place, for most of them were (Guangdongsheng caizhengting, 1934: 1/90) . This brought about the centralization of finance. Coupled with the encouragement of competitions among the tax merchants, the provincial government thus managed to procure higher incomes from the host of "miscellaneous taxes and levies." By regulation, the successful bidders were required to pay an extra 10% protection fee, euphemistically called the "accumulation fund" (gongjijin), to troops stationed in those localities where the taxes were to be collected (Qin Qingjun, 1987:297) . This was intended to defray local military expenses. It nevertheless created serious conflicts between the Second and Third Armies. The truth is that the Second Army, when assigned to take over garrison duty from the Third Army in central Guangdong, found itself deprived of that region's protection fees which were still collected by Third Army men. Chen Jitang eventually set up a special military financial committee to centralize the collection and allocation of the so-called "accumulation fund" in order to ease tensions among his commanders (Chen Boren, 1987: 301-02) .
Chen Jitang was particularly concerned about the collection of the gambling and opium taxes. Public outcry against the demoralization of society caused by gambling and opium smoking was strong. Even Chen himself realized that the rampancy of these two evils had made a mockery of his slogan of building "a model, new
Guangdong." He could not, however, afford to lose these two lucrative taxes which local functionaries of the time referred to as "Vitamins A and B" that "sustain the vitality of Guangdong" (Wei Gong, 1964: 113) .
In order to make sure that the collection of these two important taxes was placed in trustworthy hands, Chen Jitang issued both the gambling and opium licenses to a tactful tax-farmer, Huo Zhiting, who had provided him with 4-5 million yuan during the war with Zhang Fakui in late 1929. 17 In the winter of 1933, Chen came under strong public pressure to ban gambling. He subsequently ordered the prohibition of gambling in Guangzhou. It failed to have any real effect not only because his order was not strictly enforced, but also for the reason that the ban did not apply to Henan on the southern bank of the Zhujiang where most casinos operated (Wu Xiangheng, 1987: 329) . From July 1932 to June 1935, Chen netted 15,000,000 yuan a year from the gambling tax. He also reaped 11,000,000 yuan a year from the opium tax (see Table 3 ).
In order to raise the price of opium in Guangdong, Chen Jitang made the (Levich, 1993: 243-44 ). Yet, the Guangdong-Guangxi opium trade remained under the control of the Liangguang Heyi Company ran by Huo Zhiting, who also commanded an armed fleet to protect the opium trade and crack down on smuggling (Wu Xiangheng, 1987: 328-29 ). Huo's supervision of the opium traffic through holding the opium license actually typified the system of tax collection that prevailed under Chen Jitang's rule, namely that of "government supervision and merchant management" (guandu shangban).
Heavy reliance on "miscellaneous taxes and levies" as a source of revenue was certainly at odds with the spirit of the "Three-Year Administrative Plan." To carry out its promise of abolishing "harsh and insignificant miscellaneous levies" (kexi zajuan), the Guangdong Provincial Government decreed, on 1 January 1933, the abolition of 21 harsh levies (Guangdongsheng caizhengting: 1/97). In July 1934, on the eve of the convening of the Guangdong Provincial Assembly, Chen Jitang declared that miscellaneous levies worth 4,600,000 yuan a year had been annulled during the past eighteen months (Chen Jitang, 1934:233) . A year later, a Guangzhou newspaper listed 120 kinds of levies that had been abolished since early 1933, which cost the Guangdong Treasury 6,427,500 yuan a year. It also reported on the Guangdong Provincial Assembly's decision to make 1 August a commemoration day, celebrating the abolition of harsh miscellaneous levies in Guangdong (Guangzhou minguo ribao, 22 July 1935) . The truth is that no sooner had one type of levy been declared illegal than a new one sprang up to take its place. Indeed, the repeated promises to abolish harsh miscellaneous levies had been broken with equal regularity throughout Chen's rule. This is shown by the fact that shortly after his fall, the Nanjing Government The "Three-Year Administrative Plan" also provided for a reform of the land tax, and stipulated that the gambling and opium taxes were to be abrogated once the reformed land tax yielded more revenue to the Treasury. Table 3 shows that the land tax's contribution to provincial revenue was small by 1933. It was based on antiquated cadastral records, and tax evasion was serious. In October 1933, the Guangdong Provincial Government proclaimed that a progressive "provisional land tax" (linshi dishui), to be based on current land price, would replace the old land tax. It was supposedly a fair tax, as all existing surtaxes on land would be abolished. The tasks of updating land registration and determining land price were in full swing in 1934. By early 1936, most counties had adopted the new system. According to official records, the land tax quota of the province had increased by 70% as a result of the change.
Ironically, such an increase was not the result of bringing more acreage under taxation through updating land registration. It was rather due to higher tax per unit of land, for land price was often arbitrarily assessed and fixed. The landowners thus had to pay higher tax, and many old abuses remained (Lin, 1997: 106-13) .
Another way by which Chen Jitang increased tax revenue was to impose heavy duties on goods imported into Guangdong. On 15 May 1933, the Guangdong Provincial Government promulgated the levying of "special taxes on foreign agricultural products and miscellaneous items" (bolai nongchanpin zaxiang zhuanshui). In truth, these so-called "special taxes" applied not only to foreign imports, but also to most Chinese goods that were produced outside Guangdong.
Products that made use of foreign raw materials were taxed; products that competed with similar kinds of products manufactured in Guangdong were taxed; and even farm produce such as soybean and soya-bean oil produced in Manchuria were taxed (Chen Boren, 1987: 298-99) . 18 Indeed, Chen Jitang had erected a high tariff wall around Guangdong in order to protect infant government industries and to reap more revenue.
This stirred up widespread discontent outside Guangdong and even among the Guangdong merchants. People queried what the term "foreign" really meant, and criticized the "special taxes" as a disguised form of likin that hampered the development of a unified national market ("Yue ju dianding hou zhi juanshui", 1936:
3-4).
II. Increasing Non-Tax Revenue. Chen Jitang saw the development of government industries (shengying gongye) as essential to Guangdong's economic growth and, more significantly, as a way to increase incomes. The "Three-Year
Administrative Plan" included an ambitious program for the establishment of 24 government factories, with a projected capitalization in the region of 100,000,000
yuan. Top priority was assigned to the establishment of the Wengjiang hydroelectric plant (42,500,000 yuan) and an iron and steel mill (26,000,000 yuan) so as to provide a solid foundation for industrialization (Guangdongsheng diaochatongjiju, 1934: 4-5; Qin Qingjun, 1987: 282-83) . This blueprint of industrial development was nevertheless not followed during 1933-36. The reason is that the two key industries originally plan demanded huge capital outlays and promised no quick returns. As Chen Jitang's principal concern was to tap every possible source of finance, he found it necessary to change the strategy of industrial development once the "Three-Year
Administrative Plan" was under way. He subsequently made the cement and sugar industries the cornerstone of his industrial program, based on considerations of profitability.
Promotion of the cement industry was an obvious choice, for two cement factories were operating in Guangzhou at that time: an old one at Henan and a modern one at Xicun. This saved construction costs. Moreover, cement was in huge demand in Guangdong because various kinds of construction work-municipal construction, motor-road and highway construction, and the construction of the southern section of the Guangzhou-Hankou Railway-were then in full swing. In July 1933, the Henan Cement Factory became a branch of the Xicun Cement Factory where a new set of equipment was installed to double its output capacity. To facilitate the sale of cement, Chen Jitang not only imposed heavy duties on imported cement, but also required all government construction works to use locally produced cement unless special permission was granted by the Department of Finance (Guangdongsheng caizhengting, 1936: 39-41) . From June 1932 to the end of 1934, the Xicun Cement Factory yielded a net profit of over 5,000,000 yuan. Its importance was highlighted by the Guangdong Provincial Statistics Bureau: "The net profit made each year from this factory has been distributed for its own extension and for establishing other kinds of factories.
Therefore it is not only the forerunner but also a founder of other industries owned and operated by the Provincial Government" (Guangdong Provincial Statistics Bureau, 1935: 5) . produced before the sugar refinery started to mill sugar cane (Xian Zien, 1987: 260; Xie Yingming, 1987: 230-31 With a view to supplying sufficient cane to the sugar refineries, Chen Jitang encouraged sugar cane planting by providing loans to needy cane-cultivators who were required to sell their harvested cane to the government. To facilitate the sale of white sugar, Chen not only imposed heavy duties on imported sugar, but also entrusted the sale of white sugar to specially licensed wholesalers and distributors who were all required to pay earnest money and to fulfil stipulated business quotas on a monthly basis. Sugar sold without the government's permission was treated as smuggled sugar. Ordinances were passed to the effect that all such sugar would be confiscated, and the smugglers concerned would be fined 10-40 times the value of the sugar confiscated, depending on the number of offences they had committed (Guangdong shengying zhetang, 1934: 30-34, 50-51, 67-73) .
Chen Jitang also guarded his sugar business against private investment in white sugar production. By regulation, no private sugar mills could be set up without applying for registration. Capitalization was limited to 50,000 yuan per mill, whereas output was limited to three tons per day. Moreover, the use of imported syrup and coarse sugar to make white sugar was forbidden (Xian Zien, 1987: 256, 258 Chan Kei-on, 1974: 188) . It is even doubtful whether such incomes had ever been systematically and truthfully recorded. A popular saying in those days, which ridiculed the Guangdong army for "feeding on sugar," nevertheless drove home the importance of sugar incomes (Xie Yingming, 1987: 230) .
A quicker and more convenient way to raise non-tax revenue was the issuance of treasury notes and public bonds. They were usually apportioned among various counties and municipalities. In the period 1929-32, treasury notes were issued five times (December 1929 , July 1930 , August 1930 , June 1931 and January 1932 , March 1935 , July 1935 and November 1935 and public bonds twice (April and   May 1936) , amounting to 48,000,000 yuan. 22 The extent to which these treasury notes and public bonds were redeemed remains unknown.
A final point that merits attention is Chen Jitang's manipulation of the Guangdong Provincial Bank, which enjoyed the right of issuing notes and silver coins free from the control of Nanjing. From July 1932 to October 1935, the Bank had issued notes and coins amounting to 49,000,000 yuan. When Nanjing abandoned the silver standard in early November 1935, Guangdong followed suit because of the serious outflow of silver. Chen nevertheless did not adopt the fabi as the legal tender.
He instructed the Guangdong Provincial Bank to issue new kinds of paper notes for Guangdong, and offered a premium of 20% in exchanging silver coins for the new bank notes. From late 1935 to mid-1936, the Guangdong Provincial Government had purchased 110,330,000 yuan of silver from the public. In the same period, the Guangdong Provincial Bank had issued new notes amounting to 192,000,000 yuan (Shao Zongchi, 1987: 315-38; Tang Shoumin and Bei Zuyi, 1936: 4) .
Chen Jitang also borrowed heavily from the Guangdong Provincial Bank. An old-timer, who was the Bank's cashier section chief, remembered at least five occasions when Chen asked for money on behalf of the provincial government and army general headquarters. A total of 80,000,000 yuan was borrowed from the Bank on these five occasions. 23 Furthermore, Chen was said to have drawn 7,000,000 yuan and HK$3,800,000 from the Bank when he stepped down from office and took flight in July 1936 ("Jinhou zhi Yue ju", 1936 .
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Chen Jitang's principal concern was to strengthen and safeguard his regime outside the mandate of Nanjing. He could not have maintained his position as "King of the Southern Skies" had he not been able to withhold revenues due to the central government and spend them in ways he saw fit. This underlay much of the tension between Guangdong and Nanjing in the 1930s until Chen's fall in July 1936, which closed the chapter of warlordism in Guangdong.
As a "reformist" warlord, Chen Jitang aspired to make Guangdong a showcase: a Upon the expiration of the grandiose "Three-Year Administrative Plan," Chen Jitang lamented that the masses had benefited little. Out of disappointment, he criticized his subordinates for abusing power and performing duties in a perfunctory manner (Chen Jitang, 1935: 342-46; 1936: 349-50) . One wonders whether Chen realized that his own style of rule had encouraged the arbitrary exercise of power, and that his methods of governance had sheltered negligent officials from public criticisms.
He must have realized, however, that he could not afford to lose the support of his henchmen, even though he found them in fault. 6. Ka Zhishan, captain of the security police at Nanjing, gave a first-hand account of Hu Hanmin's detention and its aftermath (Ka Zhishan, 1986: 1-28 Chen Mingshu procrastinated and eventually left Guangzhou (Cheng Tiangu, 1993: 217-18) .
9. Chen Jitang talked about the "Three-Year Administrative Plan" for the first time on 14 Sept. 1932 (Chen Jitang, 1932a . For an abstract of the "Three-Year
Administrative Plan" which Chen submitted to and was endorsed by the Southwest Political Council on 17 Sept. 1932 , see Chen Jitang (1932b . (Guangdongsheng dang'anguan, 1987-89: 3/496-97) .
12. For a complete list of these 49 persons who were appointed county magistrates, see Guangdongsheng minzhengting (1936: 15-16) . For more information
